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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the domain and range results of Arrow’s impossibility, Gibbard-Satterthwaite 
and Muller-Satterthwaite theorems. We state an impossibility result and two possibility results 
for Arrow’s theorem depending on the range of the social choice mechanisms that we 
consider. We give a sufficient domain for Muller-Satterthwaite type dictatoriality to prevail. 
Moreover, we remark that this condition is also sufficient for superdictatoriality.  
 
 
 
 
 
ÖZETÇE 
 
Arrow’un imkansızlık, Gibbard-Satterthwaite ve Muller-Satterthwaite teoremleri için tanım 
ve değer kümelerini değiştirmenin etkileri incelenmiştir. Ele aldığımız sosyal seçim 
mekanizmalarının değer kümelerine bağlı olarak bir imkansızlık ve iki imkanlılık teoremi 
belirtilmiştir. Muller-Satterthwaite teoremi için diktatörlüğün sürdüğü yeterli bir tanım 
kümesi belirtilmiştir. Ayrıca, bu şart süperdiktatörlük için de yeterlidir.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In 1951 by the revolutionary Ph.D. dissertation of Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and 
Individual Values, social choice theory became a new branch of social choice theory. The 
most stricking part of his thesis was so called Arrow’s impossibility theorem which states that 
no voting system can possibly aggregate individuals’ preferences given some “reasonable” 
criterias.   
 
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem was another turning point of Social Choice Theory. Gibbard 
(1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) separately proved that it is impossible to find a                  
non-manipulable and non-dictatorial social choice mechanisms. A very important result of 
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem was another impossibility theorem by Muller and 
Satterthwaite (1977) so called Muller-Satterthwaite theorem.  
 
It is certain that there is a close relation between all these three theorems. In all of these 
theorems it is assumed that individuals may have any rational preference over the alternatives 
they are confronting. If we drop this assumption it is well-known that impossibility results 
may not prevail.  
 
Another common point of these theorems is that none of them allows ties in the choice set. In 
Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite theorems only singletons can be chosen and 
in Arrow’s theorem only a single representative is allowed to be chosen.   
 
My thesis examines the relation between these three theorems by not only making a related 
literature review of all of them but also exploring some new results that are related to this 
literature. 
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2. BASIC CONCEPTS 
 
 
Given a non-empty finite set  binary relation S β  on  is a subset of the direct product  
, i.e., of the set of all ordered pairs 
S
2S S= × S ( , )x y , such that ,x y S∈ . Whenever ( , )x y β∈ , 
we denote as x yβ . 
 
Definition 2.0.1. The binary relation β  is complete, iff for all ,x y S∈ , x yβ  or y xβ . 
 
Definition 2.0.2. The binary relation β  is transitive, iff for all , ,x y z S∈ , x yβ  and 
y zβ ⇒ x zβ . 
 
Definition 2.0.3. The binary relation β  is anti-symmetric, iff for all x S∈  and \{ }y S x∈    
x yβ  ⇒ not y xβ . 
 
Consider a society  with n≥2 confronting a finite set of alternatives 
 with . We write 
N={1,...,n}
1 2 m{a , a , ..., a }A = 3m ≥ Π  for the set of complete, transitive and anti-
symmetric binary relations over . We will call any A ρ ∈Π  a preference relation. We say 
that an alternative x  is preferred to y  by individual i  if ix yρ . The strict counter part of a 
preference relation will be denoted by *, * ', *, * 'iρ iρ ρ ρ , etc…1 A preference profile is an n-
tuple N  ρ ∈Π  of individual preferences.  
 
We let  stand for arbitrary non-empty subdomains of D ⊆ Π Π . Let Ω  be the set of complete 
and transitive binary relations over . A social welfare function (SWF) defined over  is a 
mapping .  So, given any
A D
: NDα → Ω NDρ ∈ , ( )α ρ  is a complete and transitive ordering 
over . We write A *( )α ρ  for the strict counterpart of ( )α ρ . A social choice function (SCF) 
defined over  is a mapping . So, at each D Nf:D A→ NDρ ∈ , a SCF picks a single alternative 
                                                 
1 For any ,x y A∈ , we say *x yρ  iff  x yρ and not y xρ .And similar for others. 
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from . A social choice correspondence (SCC) defined over  is a mapping A D NF:D A→ . 
Hence, at each NDρ ∈  a SCC picks one or more alternative from . A
 
 
3. ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 
 
 
3.1 Basics of Arrow’s Theorem 
  
Definition 3.1.1. A SWF  is said to be Pareto optimal (PO) iff given any : NDα → Ω x A∈ , 
any \{ }y A x∈  and any NDρ ∈   with ix yρ   for all i N∈ , we have *( )x yα ρ . In other 
words, if everyone in the society ranks x over y, so should the SWF. 
 
Definition 3.1.2. A SWF  is said to be independent of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) iff given any 
: NDα → Ω
x A∈ , any \{ }y A x∈  and any , ' NDρ ρ ∈  with ix yρ  ⇔ 'ix yρ  for all 
, we have i N∈ *( )x yα ρ ⇔ *( ')x yα ρ . In other words, a SWF must order two distinct 
alternatives x  and y , just by considering each individual’s preference over only x  and y .  
 
Definition 3.1.3. A SWF  is said to be dictatorial over the domain  if there 
exists  such that given any given any 
: NDα → Ω D
d N∈ x A∈ , any \{ }y A x∈  and any NDρ ∈ , we 
have dx yρ ⇒ *( )x yα ρ . The individual  is said to be the dictator of d α . We say α  is    
non-dictatorial (ND) whenever it is not dictatorial.  
 
Definition 3.1.4. A SWF is Arrovian iff it satisfies PO, IIA and ND. 
 
Theorem 3.1.1. [Arrow (1951)]2: There exists no Arrovian SWF : Nα Π → Ω   which is PO, 
IIA and ND. 3
 
                                                 
2 See Geanakoplos (2001) for three recent elegant proofs. 
3 In fact antisymmetricity is not necessary for Arrow’s theorem. However we will always use this property in the 
rest of this work.  
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Note that although at a first glance only PO, IIA and ND assumptions seem to be the mere 
reasons for dictatoriality, there are other hidden assumptions that Arrow made.  
 
1) The society is finite and fixed.4 
 
2) The set A of alternatives with 3A ≥  has no structure. There are studies imposing 
topological or algebraic structure on .A 5 
 
3) The range of the SWF is the set of complete and transitive orderings on .  A
 
4) The domain of the SWF is unrestricted. In other words, every rational (complete and 
transitive binary relation) ordering is admissible for each individual in the society. 
 
Throughout the paper we will concentrate on domain conditions. So it is good to review some 
literature about domain conditions on Arrow’s impossibility theorem.  
 
3.2 Domain Results for Arrow’s Theorem 
 
As we stated universal domain assumption is one of the important assumptions that lead to 
impossibility. There has been an extensive study for exploring plausible ways to escape or 
preserve this impossibility result by imposing some domain conditions. There seems to be two 
ways of restricting the universal domain. We can either apply certain restrictions to possible 
preference profiles or to possible preference orderings. Among the possibility results most of 
them were dealing the impossibility result through finding some conditions that prevents 
majority rule failing to be transitive such as the single-peakedness [Black (1948)], the     
single-cavedness [Inada (1964)] , the value-restriction [Sen (1966)] and limited agreement 
[Sen and Pattanaik (1969)].6 Another common point of these conditions is that they are 
restrictions on the preference profile. 
 
                                                 
4 See Fishburn (1970) for a result that Arrow’s theorem does not hold with infinitely many individuals. Also, See 
Kirman and Sondermann (1972) for a result which is closer to Arrow’s theorem for a society with infinite 
number of individuals. 
5 See Le Breton and Weymark (2002) for a treatment of the aggregation problem in economic environments. 
6 It is worth to mention that value restriction condition generalizes single-peakedness and single-cavedness 
conditions. 
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While finding a way to avoid intransitivity for majority rule is the centeral idea of dealing 
with the impossibility result, the free triple condition [Blau (1957) and Arrow (1963)] is its 
counterpart in finding dictatorial domains7. Since this condition will also be very important 
for our analysis it is worth to mention it. A triple8 of alternatives is said to be free in a given 
domain of preferences if and only if this domain admits all possible orderings of these three 
alternatives. Hence, a triple is free in a given domain if the restriction of the domain to the 
triple is the full domain. After Blau (1957) and Arrow (1963) proved that free triple condition 
is sufficient for dictatoriality Kalai and Muller (1977) fully characterized the non-dictatorial 
domains with the non-dictatorial decomposability condition. This condition was so messy to 
work with that Kalai, Muller and Satterthwaite (1979) found a stronger but more effective 
condition, saturation condition, that is sufficient for dictatoriality. Ozdemir and Sanver (2006)  
introduced a weaker condition called essential saturation condition. In a different context 
Dogan and Sanver (2006) proved that Arrow’s theorem prevails on domains that include the  
union of sets of leximin and leximax preferences.9
 
Lastly, we would like to mention a useful superdictatoriality result due to Ozdemir and Saver 
(2006).  
 
Definition 3.2.1. A pair of alternatives { , }x y is said to be non-trivial in the domain  iff 
there exist 
D
, 'R R D∈  such that xRy  and 'yR x . 
 
Theorem 3.2.1. Let  be a domain where every pair {D , }x y  is non-trivial. If  is                    D
α -dictatorial then  is D α -superdictatorial as well.10
 
3.3 Range Results for Arrow’s Theorem 
 
To our knowledge there is no result published in the literature that gives a dictatoriality result 
in a different range than that of Arrow’s. First, note that completeness and transitivity plays a 
vital role to get the impossibility. If any one of them does not hold there are well-known 
examples that lead to possibility. Actually, even in the quasi-transitive and complete case 
                                                 
7 Domains that prevail dictatoriality for any Arrovian SWF defined on will be called dictatorial. 
8 From now on, by a triple, we mean three distinct alternatives. 
9 Given any set of alternatives . They work with the non-subsets of  instead of alternatives themselves.  A A
10 From now on when it is necessary we will use α ,γ  and μ  letters as a prefix to make it clear that we are in 
the framework of Arrow, Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite respectively.  
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there are examples that gives possibility results. Thus, unless we impose more restrictive 
assumptions on SWF, impossibility result is no longer valid in this kind of ranges. As there is 
no research dealing with range conditions, it is our interest to investigate impossibility or 
possibility results due to a variety of range conditions. Although we sometimes have to 
choose one representative of the society this is not always the case and we might need to 
choose a committee instead of a single representative as it is the case for a parliament. Hence, 
we deal with ranges that accept a committee. First, we consider the case that number of 
individuals is fixed. Then we allow them to vary though it turns out that this option is not 
possible for our setup. The framework and proofs will be given in chapter 6. 
 
 
4. GIBBARD-SATTERTHWAITE THEOREM 
 
 
4.1 Basics of Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem 
 
Definition 4.1.1. A SCF : Nf D → A  is said to be manipulable iff there exist NDρ ∈ , i N∈  
and *i Dρ ∈ such that ( ', ) * ( , )i i i i if fρ ρ ρ ρ ρ− − . A SCF is strategy-proof (SP) if it is not 
manipulable. 
 
Definition 4.1.2. A SCF : Nf D → A  is said to be unanimous iff given any NDρ ∈  such that 
max( ; ) { }i A aρ =  for all ,i N∈ ( )f aρ = .11
 
Definition 4.1.3 A SCF : Nf D → A  is said to be onto iff for every a A∈  there exist NDρ ∈  
such that ( )f aρ = . 
 
Definition 4.1.4. A SCF : Nf D → A  is said to be dictatorial over the domain  iff there 
exist such that given any 
D
d N∈ NDρ ∈ , ( ) max( ; )df Aρ ρ∈ . 
 
                                                 
11 max( ; )i Aρ  stands for the set of maximal elements in  according to the preference relation A iρ  
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Thanks to Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) we know that a social choice function 
which is strategy-proof and onto can not be non-dictatorial given that there are at least three 
alternatives.12
 
Theorem 4.1.1. [Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975)]13:  A SCF : Nf AΠ →  is strategy-
proof and onto iff ƒ is dictatorial. 14
 
4.2 Domain Results for Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem  
 
The negative conclusion of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem relies critically on the domain 
of preferences. It is well-known that one may get some possibility results by restricting the 
domain of preferences. There are conditions of domain restrictions, which let us escape the 
impossibility. Campbell and Kelly (2003) showed that the majority rule where Condorcet 
winner is chosen is the unique strategy-proof social choice function when the domain is 
restricted with the value-restrictedness condition. Also a special case of the prior condition, 
single-peakedness, ensures the existence of many non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social 
choice rules, which are characterized by Moulin (1980), whose results are extended in 
Barberà et al. (1993). There are also some results that lead to impossibility results. Barberà 
and Peleg (1990) showed the impossibility using a domain in which Aswal et al. (2003) call 
connected.15 Then Aswal et al. (2003) showed that a strategy-proof and unanimous SCF 
defined on a  linked domain should be  superdictatorial.16 17 For the characterization though 
they note that it is not enough to consider just first two rankings of preferences. Moreover, 
Barberà et al. (2001) showed a possibility and an impossibility result depending on the 
domain they select. It is worth to mention that the possibility result that they got was not too 
far away from a dictatoriality result as they showed that in the corresponding domain a SCF  
                                                 
12  It is enough to have at least three alternatives in the range of  the SCF. 
13 See Lars-Gunnar Svensson (1999), Benoit (2000) and Sen (2001) for some simple proofs. 
14 Note that ontoness can be replaced by unanimity as under strategy-proofness (and minimal richness of the 
domain which will be defined later) both conditions are equivalent.  
15 Actually they did not formally claim that they proved the result using connected domains but for their proof 
connectedness was sufficient.  
16 It is worth to mention that in a linked domain satisfies minimal richness so under strategy-proofness ontoness 
and unanimity are equivalent. Moreover, a connected domain is linked.  
17 A domain  is said to be superdictatorial iff any superset  is also dictatorial.  D D E⊆
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should be either dictatorial or bi-dictatorial. Also, their alternatives consist of not the usual 
one but the set of non-empty subsets of a given alternative set. 18
 
It is very certain that Arrow’s theorem and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem are closely related 
and there are not only a variety of parallel proofs for Arrow’s theorem and Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem19 but also some proofs that generalize both theorems into one.20 These 
researches bring us to the question that whether there is a logical relation between domain 
conditions for each theorem to hold. For this purpose we investigate a family of domains that 
give impossibility result for both theorems.  
 
Lastly, we would like to mention a superdictatoriality result by Sanver (2006). 
 
Henceforth ( )kr ρ  will stand for the alternative ranked  according to the preference relation thk
ρ . 
 
Definition 4.2.1. We qualify a domain  as minimally rich iff for all D x A∈ , there exists 
Dρ ∈  such that 1( )r xρ = . 
 
Theorem 4.2.1. A γ -dictatorial domain  is D γ -superdictatorial iff  is minimally rich. D
 
4.3 Range Results for Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem  
  
There are some “seemingly” plausible ranges like Π  and A  that could be investigated for 
validity of a Gibbard-Satterthwaite like theorem. But prevalence of Gibbard-Satterthwaite 
theorem for both cases is a problematic concept. The most important problem seems to stem 
from the very definition of strategy-proofness. For the first case we can not say anything 
about how individuals rank a preference given their preferences for the alternatives unless 
maybe in the very case that their own preference relation is chosen.21 The situation is similar 
for the second case, i.e. the correspondence case. In the literature we have some solutions for 
                                                 
18 Actually, this kind of SCF’s are called social choice hyperfunction (SCHF).  i.e., functions that pick a non-
empty set of alternatives at each admissible preference profile over sets of alternatives. 
19 See Reny (2001) Quesada (2005) for parallel proofs Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. 
20 See Eliaz (2001). 
21  See Barberà (1977a) for a different approach to deal with a similar problem  
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the latter case through some additional extension axioms that show ways to order sets given 
the preferences over alternatives. Loosely speaking, Barberà (1977a) and Kelly (1977) 
showed that under certain regularity conditions, a strategy-proof social decision function 
necessarily makes some individuals weak dictator22. Barberà (1977b) has a dictatoriality 
result though he had to impose additional strong properties to the rule, unanimity and  positive 
responsiveness, in addition to strategy-proofness. Using a stronger strategy-proofness 
assumption and a unanimity assumption which he calls non-imposedness Feldman (1980) 
showed that a SCC satisfying these properties is obliged to be either dictatorial or                 
bi-dictatorial. Duggan and Schwartz (2000) showed that ontoness, residually resoluteness23 
and strategy-proofness is sufficient for dictatoriality. Then Ching and Zhou (2002) showed 
that given their extension axiom a strategy-proof  SCC should be either dictatorial or constant. 
It is worth to note that their extension axiom leads to an incomplete ordering on the power set 
of alternatives. They also showed the same result with a domain restricted to continuous 
preferences. Barberà et al. (2001) considered the domains that are consistent with conditional 
expected utility maximization, one that considers equal probabilities and the other has no 
restriction on the probabilities. They showed that under these domains strategy-proofness and 
unanimity of SCHFs imply dictatoriality or bi-dictatoriality for  the former domain and for the 
latter they imply just dictatoriality. Actually, their result “almost” implies the result of Ching 
and Zhou (2002). Except these one might also see Fishburn (1972), Gärdenfors (1976), 
Barberà, Bogomolnaia and Stel (1998), Benoit (2002), Taylor (2005), Ozyurt and Sanver 
(2006) for related literature.24 25
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 An individual is a weak dictator iff whenever prefers d d x to y and the agenda is restricted to x versus y , 
x  must at least tie y . Actually, Barberà (1977a) used a similar definition that he called oligarchy. 
23 A condition that requires the choice function to be singleton in certain cases 
24 Note that some of the results given are for social choice rules that map preference profiles to lotteries and 
some to sets but we did not mention the difference.  
25 See Ranking Sets of Objects, of Barberà, Bossert and Pattanaik, for a very good resourse understanding 
extension axioms  
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5. MULLER-SATTERTHWAITE THEOREM 
 
 
5.1 Basics of Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem 
 
Henceforth ( ; )L a ρ  will stand for the lower contour set of  according to the preference 
relation 
a
ρ . i.e. ( ; ) { : }L a x A a xρ ρ= ∈ . 
 
Definition 5.1.1. A SCF : Nf D → A  is said to be Maskin monotonic (MM) iff for all 
, ' Dρ ρ ∈ , ( ; ) ( ; ')L a L aρ ρ⊆ and ( )f aρ =  implies ( ')f aρ = . 
 
Theorem 5.1.1. [Muller and Satterthwaite (1977)] A SCF : Nf AΠ →  is Maskin 
monotonic and onto iff ƒ is dictatorial.   
 
It is worth to note that under minimal richness condition in any domain a Maskin monotonic 
SCF is unanimous if and only if it is onto. So we can easily replace ontoness condition with 
unanimity and still preserve the dictatoriality result. The importance of the theorem comes 
from its close relation with Nash implementability. Maskin (1999)26 show that a SCF that 
satisfies Maskin monotonicity and a condition called no veto power then it is Nash 
implementable. Moreover, Nash implementibility implies Maskin monotonicity. Thus, 
Maskin’s result is almost a characterization of Nash implementibility.  
 
The Muller-Satterthwaite theorem was first proven as a consequence of Gibbard-Satterthwaite 
and Arrow theorems. After this indirect proof some direct and easier proofs given in the 
literature like that of  Moulin (1988),  Myerson (1996) and Renny (2001)27.  There are also 
some results showing the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity or its variations to 
strategy proofness. For example, Tanaka (2001) showed equivalence between a monotonicity 
conditions that he calls generalized monotonicity and strategy-proofness. Actually, this 
condition was nothing but a special case of independence of person-by-person monotonicity 
                                                 
26 The first version of this article circulated as an MIT working paper in 1977. Evidently, Maskin had some 
difficulties getting his paper published.  
27 See Renny  (2001) for a proof of  (modified) Muller-Satterthwaite and Arrow’s theorem is given in a parallel 
fassion.    
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(IPM)28 that Dasgupta et al. (1979) introduced. IPM is a condition for SCCs but if we restrict 
the definition to singletons it turns out that these two definitions are same. Moreover, it is 
well-known that Dasgupta et al. (1979) proved the equivalence of IPM with strategy 
proofness.  
 
5.2 Domain Results for Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem  
 
A similar close relation between Arrow’s theorem and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 
prevails between Muller-Satterthwaite and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem so it is a plausible 
question to ask for a domain condition that leads all these theorems to hold at a time. But it is 
unfortunate that to our knowledge there is no literature that deals with the domain conditions 
of Muller-Satterthwaite theorem. Moreover, although we can state a small theorem to give 
some rough idea about sufficient domains for μ -dictatoriality and a superdictatoriality result, 
this result does not help us much to make such a connection. Thus, this question is still 
waiting for a satisfactory answer.  
 
Definition 5.2.1. A SCF : Nf AΠ →  is said to satisfy independent person-by-person 
monotonicity (IPM) iff Nρ∀ ∈Π , i N∀ ∈ , iρ∀ ∈Π , { , }a b A∀ ⊆ , if ( , )i if aρ ρ− =  and 
ia bρ ⇒ *ia bρ then ( ', )i if bρ ρ− ≠ . 
 
Definition 5.2.2. For a set of alternatives , the domain  is said to be rich iff A D ⊆ Π
, ' Dρ ρ∀ ∈  and  such that a b{ , }a b A∀ ⊆ ρ ⇒ 'a bρ  and *a bρ ⇒ *'a bρ , then there exists 
'' Dρ ∈  such that ( ; ) ( ; '')L a L aρ ρ⊆  and ( ; ') ( ; '')L b L bρ ρ⊆ . 
 
Definition 5.2.3. A pair of alternatives ja ,  is said to be connected, denoted ka ja ∼ ka , if 
there exists , ' Dρ ρ ∈  such that 1( )r aρ = , 2 ( )r bρ = , 1( ')r bρ =  and 2 ( ')r aρ = . 
 
Definition 5.2.4. Let B A⊂  and ja B∉ . Then  is linked to ja B  if there exists ,k ra a B∈  
such that  and . ka a∼ j
                                                
r ja a∼
 
 
28 IPM will be defined in next section. 
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Definition 5.2.5. The domain  is linked if there exists a one to one function D : A Aσ →  
such that  
 
i)  (1) (2)a aσ σ∼
ii)  is linked to , ( )jaσ (1) ( 1){ ,..., }ja aσ σ − 3,...,j m=  
 
Lemma 5.1.1. [Theorem 4.3.1. Dasgupta et al. (1979)] Let . A SCF D ⊆ Π : Nf D A→  is 
strategy-proof iff it is IPM.  
 
Lemma 5.1.2. [Corollary 3.2.3. Dasgupta et al. (1979)] Let  be a rich domain. Then 
Maskin monotonicity and IPM are equivalent in a SCF .  
D ⊆ Π
 
Lemma 5.1.3. [Theorem 3.1. Aswal et al. (2003)] Let  be a linked domain then  is D ⊆ Π D
μ -dictatorial. 29
 
Theorem 5.1.1. Let  be a linked and rich domain then  is D ⊆ Π D μ -dictatorial.  
 
Proof: Result directly follows from the lemmas above.  
 
Corollary 5.1.2. Let  be a linked and rich domain then  is D ⊆ Π D μ -superdictatorial. 
 
Proof: Follows directly from Theorem 5.1.1 and Theorem 4.2.1  
 
5.3 Range Results for Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem 
 
Like the Gibbard-Satterthwaite case the results are centered at SCCs instead of SWFs. As the 
structure of SCCs are distinct from that of SCFs a new kind of monotonicity definition 
needed. The results relating this part are generally concentrated on finding a monotonicity 
condition that is equivalent to strategy-proofness conditions that were made in the literature. 
There is not much study going on related to this session we just mention Nehring (1998) and 
Tanaka (2003) as some reference and leave the rest to the reader.  
                                                 
29 As a linked domain is also minimally rich it is no harm to replace unanimity assumption of  Aswal et al. 
(2003) with ontoness.  
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 6. CHOOSING A COMMITTEE 
 
 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is one of the most disappointing theorems of social choice. But 
it only considers the special case of choosing a single “opinion” to represent  the society as a 
whole. What happens if it could be chosen more than a single opinion? One reason for dealing 
with this question could be that decision mechanism may not give a precise answer but 
instead recommend some possible candidate opinions. Another possibility is that it could be 
the case that we need to choose an opinion from each part of a region and gather a set of 
members to represent the whole region as a whole. One important example for this is 
choosing the parliament’s members to represent all the society. So it seems this kind of 
generalizations of Arrow’s theorem has meaningful applications. But there seems to be more 
than one way of generalizing Arrow’s theorem in this sense and we examine all possible cases 
that we can think of.  Our analysis consists of three parts.     
 
6.1 Range as a Vector of Individuals: A Dictatoriality Result 
 
In this part we give a series definitions and a dictatoriality theorem that follows directly from 
Arrow’s theorem itself.  
 
Definition 6.1.2. A generalized social welfare function (GSWF) is a mapping 
.  
1
:
T
N t
t
α
=
Π → Ω∪
Definition 6.1.2. A GSWF  is said to be Pareto optimal (PO) iff whenever 
1
:
T
N
t
α
=
Π → Ω∪ t
{ , }x y A∀ ⊆ , , i N∀ ∈ ix yρ  implies { , }( ) ...x y x x xy y yα ρ
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  where { , }x yα  is the restriction 
of α  to x  and y .30  
 
                                                 
30 By 
x
y
  we mean x  is preferred to y  and by xy  we mean x  and y  are indifferent. For technical simplicity 
we will not use “,” to separate preferences in our notation.  
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Definition: 6.1.3. A GSWF  is said to satisfy independence of irrelevant 
alternatives condition (IIA) if for any pair of alternatives {
1
:
T
N
t
α
=
Π → Ω∪ t
, }x y ⊆ A  and for any pair of 
preference profiles , ' Nρ ρ ∈Π  with the property that, i N∀ ∈ , 'i ix y x yρ ρ⇔  we have that 
{ , } { , }( ) ( ')x y x yα ρ α ρ= . 
 
Theorem 6.1.1.Let  be a GSWF satisfying IIA. Then  and a 
mapping 
1
:
T
N
t
α
=
Π → Ω∪ t T{1,..., }K∃ ∈
l : Nα Π → ΩK such that lα α= . i.e. Imposing IIA condition prevents number of 
committee members to vary. 
 
Proof: Let { , , }x y z A⊆  be any triple of alternatives and Nρ ∈Π  be an arbitrary but fixed 
preference profile. Now, let ', " Nρ ρ ∈Π  be any preference profiles with the property that, 
, i N∀ ∈ 'i ix y x yρ⇔ ''i iz x z x, ρ ρ ρ⇔ "i, and 'i iz y z y z yρ ρ ρ⇔ ⇔ . It can be easily checked 
that such preference profiles always exist. Then by IIA we have that { , } { , }( ) ( ')x y x yα ρ α ρ= , 
{ , } { , }( ) ( ")x z x zα ρ α ρ=  and { , } { , } { , }( ) ( ') ( ")y z y z y zα ρ α ρ α ρ= = . Let ( )α ρ  stand for the number 
of components of α  given that the preference profile is ρ . Thus, we conclude that 
{ , } { , }( ) ( )x y x zα ρ α ρ= K=  for some {1,..., }K T∈ . Hence, by IIA result follows 
immediately.  
  
Hence, from now on we will denote a GSWF as a mapping : Nα KΠ → Ω  by implicitly 
assuming that it satisfies IIA.  
 
Definition 6.1.4. A GSWF   is said to be dictatorial for : Nα Π → ΩK thj component iff for 
thj component of α , ∃ { }1, 2,3,...,d ∈ N  such that *( )d jx y x yρ α ρ⇒  
 
Definition 6.1.5. A GSWF : Nα KΠ → Ω   is said to be dictatorial iff for any 
{ }1, 2,3,...,j N∈ , α  is dictatorial for thj  component. 
 
Theorem 6.1.2. Any GSWF  satisfying PO and IIA has to be dictatorial. : Nα Π → ΩK
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Proof: Let j  be an arbitrary component of α . By Arrow’s impossibility theorem we 
conclude that α  is dictatorial for thj  component. As j  were arbitrary dictatoriality of α  
follows immediately.  
 
6.2 Range as a Set of Individuals: An Oligarchy Result 
 
We give a possibility result for Arrow’s theorem. Our result can be thought as an Arrow’s 
theorem version of the result of Tanaka (2003) in which he gave an oligarchy result for SCCs 
in Gibbard-Satterthwaite environment.  
 
Definition 6.2.1. A social welfare correspondence (SWC) is a mapping . : 2 \{ }Nα ΩΠ → ∅
Definition 6.2.2. A SWC  is said to be Pareto optimal (PO) iff whenever : 2 \{ }Nα ΩΠ → ∅
{ , }x y A∀ ⊆ , , i N∀ ∈ ix yρ  implies { , }( )x y xyα ρ
⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭ .   
 
Definition: 6.2.3. A SWC  is said to satisfy independence of irrelevant 
alternatives condition (IIA) if for any pair of alternatives {
: 2 \{ }Nα ΩΠ → ∅
, }x y ⊆ A  and for any pair of 
preference profiles , ' Nρ ρ ∈Π  with the property that, i N∀ ∈ , 'i ix y x yρ ρ⇔  we have that 
{ , } { , }( ) ( ')x y x yα ρ α ρ= . 
 
Remark 6.2.1. By PO it is trivial that the only possible setup for a committee that has a fixed 
number of members is the case of choosing singleton which is nothing but Arrow’s case. 
Thus, we will only be interested in SWCs. 
 
Definition 6.2.4. A SWC  is said to be dictatorial iff there exist a set 
 such that for any preference profile
: 2 \{ }Nα ΩΠ → ∅
K N⊆ Nρ ∈Π  and for any individual  there exists 
an ordering 
i K∈
' ( )ρ α ρ∈  with, { , }x y A∀ ⊆ , ix yρ  ⇒ *'x yρ .  
 
First, we give an example of a SWC that is not dictatorial.  
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For simplicity consider a three person and three alternative world and following SWC: 
1
( ) { }
N
i
i
α ρ
=
=∪ ρ  for 
a a b
b c c
c b a
ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪≠ ⎨⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
⎪⎬  and for 
a a b
b c c
c b a
ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 let ( )
a c
b b
c a
α ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪= ⎨⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
⎪⎬  then we see 
that α  is not dictatorial. 
 
Definition 6.2.5. A SWC  is said to be pairwise oligarchical iff there 
exists  such that 
: 2 \{ }Nα ΩΠ → ∅
K N∅ ≠ ⊆ Nρ∀ ∈Π , { , }x y A∀ ⊆ , i K∀ ∈ , ix yρ  ⇒ { , }( )x yxy α ρ∈ . The 
maximal  that makes K α  pairwise oligarchical is said to be pairwise oligarchy. 
 
 
Definition 6.2.6. Given a SWC , we say that a subset of agents  is : 2 \{ }Nα ΩΠ → ∅ S N⊆
 
i) Decisive for x  over y  if whenever every agent in  prefers S x  to y  and every agent not in 
 prefers S y  to x  we have { , }( )x y
x
y
α ρ∈  
ii) Decisive if for any pair { , }x y ⊆ A , S is decisive for x  over y . 
 
iii) Completely decisive for x  over y  if whenever every agent in S prefers x  to y we have 
{ , }( )x y
x
y
α ρ∈  
 
iv) Completely decisive if for any pair { , }x y ⊆ A , S is completely decisive for x  over y . 
  
Lemma 6.2.1. Let : 2 \{ }Nα ΩΠ → ∅  be a SWC that is PO and IIA. Then there is an h N∈  
such that is completely decisive. S={h}
 
Proof: We will show our lemma in 5 steps. 
 
Step1: If for some { , }x y A⊆ ,  is decisive for S N⊆ x  over y , then for any ,  is 
decisive for 
z x≠ S
x  over . Similarly, we have for any z z y≠ ,  is decisive for  over S z y . 
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 If  there is nothing to prove. So assume that z y= z y≠ . By IIA it is enough to find a profile 
of preferences Nρ ∈Π  such that { , }( )x zxz α ρ∈ . Now consider the following profile of 
preferences Nρ ∈Π  where  
 
i ix y zρ ρ    i S∀ ∈
i iy z xρ ρ     i \N∀ ∈ S
 
We know that  is decisive S x  over y  so { , }( )x y
x
y
α ρ∈ . Also by PO we have that 
{ , }( )y z
y
z
α ρ ⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭ . Then we should have { , }( )x z
x
z
α ρ∈ . This shows that  is decisive for S x  over 
, . Note that “=” in z z x∀ ≠ { , }( )y z yzα ρ
⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭  was very important for us to get our transitivity 
like result. 
 
Similarly, one can show that for any z y≠ ,  is decisive for  over S z y . 
 
Step2: If  is decisive for S N⊆ x  over y  for some pair { , }x y ⊆ A , then  is decisive. S
 
Let  be an alternative which is distinct from z x  and y  also let  be an alternative which is 
distinct from . By step1 we know that  is decisive for  over 
w
z S z y . So applying step1 we 
have that  is decisive for  over . Now, let {   be arbitrary. If a=z  or S z w , }a b A⊆ b=z  the 
result follows immediately. So assume that a z≠  and b z≠ . Since  is decisive for  over 
, we have  is decisive for  over a . But then S  is decisive for  over . As {  was 
arbitrary we conclude that  is decisive. 
S z
w S z b a , }a b
S
 
Step3: There exists a decisive set. 
 
Let  be arbitrary. Take an arbitrary triple {S N⊆ , , }x y z A⊆  and consider a profile of 
preferences Nρ ∈Π   where  
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i ix z yρ ρ    i S∀ ∈
i iy x zρ ρ     i \N∀ ∈ S
 
By PO we know that { , }( )x z
x
z
α ρ ⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭ . If { , }( )x y
x
y
α ρ∈   is decisive so we are done. If S
{ , }( )x y
x
y
α ρ∉  then we have that { , }( )y zyz α ρ∈  but this means  is decisive. So for any set 
 we have either  or  is decisive. So there exists a decisive set. 
\ SN
S N⊆ S \ SN
 
Step4: If  is decisive then, S is completely decisive.  S N⊆
 
Let { , }x y ⊆ A  be an arbitrary pair. All we need is to show that \ ST N∀ ⊆  we have 
{ , }( )x y
x
y
α ρ∈  whenever every agent in  and T prefers  to  and every other agent prefers 
 to . In order to show this consider a profile of preferences 
S x y
y x Nρ ∈Π  such that 
 
i ix z yρ ρ    i S∀ ∈
i iz x yρ ρ     i T∀ ∈
i iz y xρ ρ    i \ (N S T∀ ∈ ∪ )
 
Since  is decisive S { , }( )x z
x
z
α ρ∈ . Also by PO we have { , }( )y z zyα ρ
⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭  so we have 
{ , }( )x y
x
y
α ρ∈ . Hence  is completely decisive for S x over y . But x and y were arbitrary so  
is completely decisive. 
S
 
Step5: There exist a completely decisive set which is a singleton. 
 
Let  be decisive. We know that there exists such a set by step3. Let  be arbitrary. 
If  is decisive we are done. So assume not. Consider a profile of preferences 
S N⊆ h S∈
\{ }S h Nρ ∈Π  
such that 
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i iz x yρ ρ    i S\{h}∀ ∈
i ix y zρ ρ     i { }h∀ ∈
i iy z xρ ρ    i N∀ ∈
 
Since  is decisive S { , }( )x y
x
y
α ρ∈ . If { , }( )y zzy α ρ∈  then  is decisive so we would get a 
contradiction. So 
\{ }S h
{ , }( )y z
z
y
α ρ∉ . But in any case we will have { , }( )x zxz α ρ∈ . So {  is 
decisive. Thus we conclude that if  is decisive then {  or  is also decisive. If {  is 
decisive we are done. So assume not. Then  is decisive. Now, let  be 
arbitrary and apply same argument above. Hence, {  or  is decisive. Continuing 
this way we conclude that there exist a completely decisive set which is a singleton as to be 
shown. 
}h
S }h \{ }S h }h
\{ }S h ' \{ }h S h∈
'}h \{ , '}S h h
 
Theorem 6.2.1. Any SWC  satisfying PO and IIA has to be pairwise 
oligarchical.  
: 2 \{ }Nα ΩΠ → ∅
 
Proof:  Let  be an arbitrary SWC that satisfies IIA and PO. Consider all 
decisive sets and we know that for each of these sets there is at least one completely decisive 
singleton set. Take the union of these singleton sets and call this union . It is obvious that 
 is a pairwise oligarchy which completes the proof. 
: 2 \{ }Nα ΩΠ → ∅
K
K
 
Remark 6.2.2.  Note that for any given SWC : 2 \{ }Nα ΩΠ → ∅  satisfying PO and IIA it is 
always possible to find another SWC l : 2 \{Nα Ω }Π → ∅ , with Nρ∀ ∈Π  l( ) 2α ρ ≤ , that is 
IIA equivalent to α . Loosely speaking, we say that two SWCs are IIA equivalent if IIA can 
not detect the difference between them.  
 
6.3 Range as a Multiset of Individuals: An Oligarchy Result 
 
Although the definitions and the results are almost the same as that of section 6.2, for the sake 
of completeness we state them.  
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A multiset can be formally defined as a set pairs {( , ( )) : }M a a a Sψ= ∈  where  is some set 
and 
S
: Sψ +→ `  is a function from  to the set S +` . The set  is called the underlying set of 
elements. For each  the multiplicity (that is, number of occurrences) of a  is the number 
S
a S∈
( )aψ . We denote a multiset just like a set that allows repeatation of its elements. For 
example, the multiset {(  is written as { . An element  is said to be an 
element of a multiset 
,1), ( , 2)}a b , , }a b b a S∈
M , denoted like usual set notation a M∈ , if ( , )a t M∃ ∈  with . 
We denote a multiset that has  elements as 
1t ≥
t tM . 
 
Definition 6.3.1. A social welfare multiset function  (SWMF)  is a mapping 
1
:
T
N
t
t
Mα
=
Π →∪ . 
Definition 6.3.2. A SWMF 
1
:
T
N
t
t
Mα
=
Π →∪  is said to be Pareto optimal (PO) iff  whenever 
{ , }x y A∀ ⊆ ,  , i N∀ ∈ ix yρ  implies  { , }( ) ...x y x x xy y yα ρ
⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭ .   
Definition: 6.3.3. A SWMF 
1
:
T
N
t
t
Mα
=
Π →∪   is said to satisfy independence of irrelevant 
alternatives condition (IIA) if for any pair of alternatives { , }x y ⊆ A  and for any pair of 
preference profiles , ' Nρ ρ ∈Π  with the property that, i N∀ ∈ , 'i ix y x yρ ρ⇔  we have that 
{ , } { , }( ) ( ')x y x yα ρ α ρ= .  
 
Theorem 6.3.1.Let 
1
:
T
N
t
t
Mα
=
Π →∪  be a SWMF satisfying IIA. Then  and a 
mapping 
{1,..., }K∃ ∈ T
l : N KMα Π → such that lα α= . i.e. Imposing IIA condition prevents number of 
committee members to vary. 
 
Proof: The proof is omitted as it is very similar to that of Theorem 6.1.1. 
 
Hence, from now on we will denote a SWMF as a mapping : N KMα Π →  by implicitly 
assuming that it satisfies IIA. 
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Definition 6.3.4. A SWMF : N KMα Π →  is said to be dictatorial iff there exist a set  
such that for any preference profile
K N⊆
Nρ ∈Π  and for any individual i  there exists an 
ordering 
K∈
' ( )ρ α ρ∈  with, { , }x y A∀ ⊆ , ix yρ  ⇒ *'x yρ .  
 
First, we give an example of a SWMF that is not dictatorial.  
 
For simplicity consider a three person and three alternative world and following SWC: 
1 2 3( ) { , , }α ρ ρ ρ ρ=  for 
a a b
b c c
c b a
ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪≠ ⎨⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
⎪⎬  and for 
a a b
b c c
c b a
ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 let ( )
a a c
b b b
c c a
α ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 then 
we see that α  is not dictatorial. 
 
Definition 6.3.5. A SWMF : N KMα Π →  is said to be pairwise oligarchical iff there exists 
 such that K N∅ ≠ ⊆ Nρ∀ ∈Π , { , }x y A∀ ⊆ , i K∀ ∈ , ix yρ  ⇒ { , }( )x yxy α ρ∈ . The maximal 
 that makes K α  pairwise oligarchical is said to be pairwise oligarchy. 
 
 
Definition 6.3.6. Given a SWMF : N KMα Π → , we say that a subset of agents  is: S N⊆
 
i) Decisive for x  over y  if whenever every agent in  prefers S x  to y  and every agent not in 
 prefers S y  to x  we have { , }( )x y
x
y
α ρ∈  
ii) Decisive if for any pair { , }x y ⊆ A , S is decisive for x  over y . 
 
iii) Completely decisive for x  over y  if whenever every agent in S prefers x  to y we have 
{ , }( )x y
x
y
α ρ∈  
 
iv) Completely decisive if for any pair { , }x y ⊆ A , S is completely decisive for x  over y . 
 
Theorem 6.3.2. If a SWMF : N KMα Π →  is PO and IIA then α  is pairwise oligarchical. 
 
Proof: The proof is omitted as it is a replication of Theorem 6.2.2.   
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
I tried to give some literature review for some of the most important impossibility theorems 
and while doing this I also tried to make some comments to express the close relation between 
them.  
 
 
To our knowlegde there is no literature dealing with social welfare correspondences (SWC) or 
social welfare multiset functions (SWMF) . It is usual that society choose more than one 
representative hence it is interesting to see the consequences of this setup. Moreover, Arrow’s 
theorem is a corollary to our setup as one representative case is just a special case of at least 
one individual case. We explore that Arrow’s impossibility holds in the case that we chose 
representatives for a specific place. For example, if we are to choose a committee and at the 
begingging if we know that each member of the committee will be assigned to a specific city 
(or say a specific chair) then by the vector case we conclude that Arrow’s impossibility still 
prevails. But when we are to assign committee member to anonymous places (or say send 
them to the same place as a group) then things reverse and we get a possibility result in the 
sense that we do not need to choose dictators. There is still a disturbing oligarchy result, but it 
is much weaker then dictatoriality result. Actually, our oligarchy result is very natural due to 
our IIA assumption. As a conclusion, we conclude that if we are to choose a committee of 
representatives we see that Arrow’s negative result is not that disturbing for it only holds if 
our committee consists of one individual.   
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